Proposal for Administration Engineering
Akinobu Yasumoto
Executive Director, GISPRI
Within the harsh competition of institutional
reform among countries, those who succeed
in developing the administration engineering for an institutional design
will be the winners in the next
decade.
'Market failure' is often pointed out. However, most 'Market failure'
is actually the failure of an institution
rather than the failure of the market. Let me take solutions
to environmental problems, which are often considered as market failures,
as an example.
'Leave everything to the market' means
'leave everything to the independent choice of
individuals.' Even though a whole nation believes unanimously
that environmental protection is
important, it will be difficult to achieve a good result by leaving
solutions to environmental problems to the market without preparing
an institution to create incentives for environmental protection. In
such a situation, as costs deriving from
environmental protection become handicaps in competition unless they
are guaranteed by institutions,
those who try to benefit by avoiding costs would emerge. Because
it is natural under such concerns that no one would bear costs to protect
the environment. An effort to solve
problems by moralistic argument without preparing a rigorous
institution might result in a situation where only the honest and obedient
become losers. The reason the market is
not oriented toward environmental protection despite
unanimous support for protection, is in this case, not because there
is a problem in market functioning
but because no offering incentives to environmental protection is
built in the market.
If market performance changes according to institutions, it is reasonable
to consider that institutions should
be reformed to achieve a good performance. The importance of
institutions has been recognized ever since it was argued by Adam Smith.
However, to my surprise, many economists -with few exceptions like Hurwicz-have
been skeptical toward institutional design. This is despite the fact
that many institutions, like laws and the
in-house rules of companies -- with the exception of customs and other
voluntary institutions -- have
been developed intentionally. If we have to prepare rules to be
observed by human society through laws
and other means in any case, we should prepare them
only after thorough examination of chains of incentives from the society
and the organization levels to
the individual level.
Of course, it is generally difficult to judge the root cause of a certain
economic phenomenon in the actual
economy and to prescribe effective actions with appropriate incentives.
(For example, it is difficult to make a judgement from the actual bubble
phenomenon whether the emergence of the
bubble economy was due to a lack of information or
other elements, whether the emergence of the bubble economy can be avoided
through certain types of regulation,
etc.) However, with the advance of theories such as game theory
and auction theory, experiments that were
traditionally considered available only in the sphere
of the natural sciences have now become also available in economics.
Such methods are becoming applicable to
institutional design. We are now being ushered into
the age of the birth of a new engineering which can be called
'administration engineering' or
'institutional engineering', named after the recently popular 'financial
engineering'.
Paradoxically the more the market takes over social decision making
from the government due to deregulation,
the more important institutional design of the market will become a
governmental task. Regardless of efforts
on the company level as well as on the individual level,
such effort will not bear fruit as long as the institutional system
of a nation causes inefficiency
and inequality. State-of-the-art theories and experiments are applied
to designs for airplanes or large-scale
bridges as a matter of course. State-of-the-art theories and
experiments should be freely used for
an institutional design as well, to realize the best possible
achievement down to the details. We have now been ushered into such
age.
With the advance of globalization, the time has come for companies to
choose countries. In such a situation,
governments and people that cannot choose countries to belong to cannot
but develop good institutions. It is expected
that international competition in the future will increasingly
lead to institutional competition among countries. Hoping for new developments
in Japan, I anticipate progress in administration
engineering.
*This paper is translated from his Japanese original paper in the "Chikyu-ken(GISPRI)
Newsletter" Vol.12,
No.4 issued in April 2000.
(May 1st, 2000)
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