China in Transition
and its Outlook for the Future
Satoshi Amako
Professor, Faculty of International Politics and Economy,
Aoyama Gakuin University
Introduction
The outlook for China,
post-Deng Xiaoping, has been widely discussed around the world including
Japan, the United States and Hong Kong. Why does China attract this
much attention? China made a major turnabout at the end of 1978 to follow
a line of modernization.
From that time on,
China has made active efforts to improve its relationship and deepen
mutual dependency with the international community, resulting in the
worldwide perception that China is a nation with enormous economic potential.
Some are even forecasting that the economy of Greater China, including
Hong Kong and Taiwan, will be the largest in the world by the turn of
the century, surpassing even that of the United States.
Watching the collapse
the socialist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and despite
the end of the cold war, China has consistently modernized its military
and increased its armaments since the late 1980s. Coupled with its independent
foreign policies pursued from earlier days, China is gaining huge power
without yielding to the wishes of the United States in terms of international
politics and security.
The recent hard Chinese
stance toward territorial disputes in the South China Sea, tensions
in the bilateral relationship between China and the United States, and
repeated nuclear tests contribute to the development of the presence
of China as a potential threat to the international community. At the
same time, pressure exerted upon the world by the sheer size of China's
population, which has reached 1.2 billion and is still growing by 15
million every year, may not be taken lightly from socioeconomic as well
as political perspectives.
A number of questions
arise. To name but a few: How far will China expand in the next century
with its aim of becoming a "rich and powerful nation?" Will
it really surpass the United States and become the world's greatest
economic super power? To what extent is the theory of a Chinese threat
real? Or in contrast with this swelling power, will the Communist Party's
autocratic regime continue, or will there be major political turmoil
in the post-Deng Xiaoping period? Might the Hong Kong and Taiwan questions
cause instability in the international community? Will economic reforms
really succeed in view of serious strains on the Chinese social fabric
already apparent in various ways?
In examining the present
and future of China, it will not suffice to speculate on the issue by
merely piecing together superficial phenomena on the political, economic
and social arenas, particularly the power struggle among the central
leadership, economic problems, and official economic and foreign policies.
Correct understanding of China probably involves analysis within a certain
framework of references as an indispensable approach. This framework
must take into account cultural aspects and diverse social structures
formed by vast geographic expansion and long history. Without such an
approach, this country will not disclose its overall picture. Since
exact presentation of such a framework is beyond the scope of this paper(1),
the author will simply identify structural perspectives for examining
modern China.
1. Five key considerations
for understanding the present condition.
First, it is necessary
to identify fundamental characteristics peculiar to China formed by
long history extending several thousand years, and within geographic
and natural restrictions, and thereby will not easily undergo any transformation.
This paper first identifies them as "three vastnesses" and
secondly as geographic diversities. "Three vastnesses" consist
of (i) vast size of population far exceeding the world's average, (ii)
vast size of land areas reaching close to 9.6 million square kilometers,
which is the third largest in the world and comparable with that of
all of Europe, and (iii) spiritual vastness as represented in Chinese
thought such as "respect for unity?" and the Chinese perception
of order with a concentric expanse under authoritarian hierarchy.
The three vastnesses
exert strong influence and impose restrictions on diverse phenomena
and efforts in China. For example, the vast size of its population creates
constraints as seen in the adoption of the "one-child" policy,
and the need to promote economic reforms while securing an enormous
food supply and number of jobs. Vast land areas require colossal administrative
machinery and ideology to reign over them. The discipline of traditional
Chinese thought seems to exert a certain degree of influence upon its
foreign policy stance.
The second consideration,
or geographical diversities, includes diversity of nature (i.e., topography
ranging from the subarctic zone to tropics, marshland to desert, and
mountains to plains), multiracial constitution and that of customs of
life. Aside from these underlying diversities, social, economic and
cultural differences such as cities vs. countryside, coastal vs. interior
provinces, and elites vs. the masses have significant meanings. Reigning
over such diversities from the bottom of the social scale to the periphery
of the territory to run effective government has not been easy despite
the existence of powerful leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping,
and strong rule by one-party autocracy. Infiltration and thorough implementation
of policy measures have also been difficult. China has never been as
simple a political entity as can be painted in a single color. Geographic
diversities have been the major factor behind these characteristics.
The third key consideration
is the strength of the Communist Party rule which has maintained the
central position in politics, economy and social life since the founding
of the People's Republic of China. The Communist Party has a dominating
presence.
Its total membership
is about 55 million, representing roughly 4 percent of the national
population. Chinese armed forces are the largest in the world, totaling
over 3 million, and are basically the Communist Party's military. Mass
organizations, including Communist Youth League and Federation of Women
and Youth, support the party rule as its substructures.
As for political organizations
other than the Communist Party, there are eight democratic factions
including Chinese Democratic Federation and Revolutionary Commission
of Chinese Nationalist Party, which are active on the National People's
Congress and People's Congress on Political Cooperation and Commerce.
Combined membership of these organizations totals less than one million.
They openly acknowledge that they submit to the guidance of the Communist
Party. They are a far cry from an opposing force to the Communist Party.
Other non-communist party activities include the Democratic Wall movement
in 1978, and the pro-democracy movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989,
but participating organizations were subject to crackdown, and their
leaders were either arrested or forced into exile. In other words, there
is no organ that can replace the Communist Party and exercise sovereign
power. This will not hold true if the army takes action to replace the
party, but such a situation is unlikely at present.
As shown, the Communist
Party enjoys a powerful presence, but this does not mean that there
is no problem in the country's reign due more than anything else to
signs of "instability" beginning to surface in the colossal
organization of the Communist Party itself. Firstly, with the emphasis
on economic activities and expansion of autonomy brought about by the
pursuit of the reformist open-door policies, subordinate organizations
have begun to go their own way, or lay aside party activities to concentrate
on moneymaking. This has resulted in the malfunction of party organizations,
and the reduction of the central government's ability to exercise control
and ensure thorough implementation of its policies. As disengagement
from ideology progresses, their ideological hold on the people has weakened.
The famous phrase, "if the higher-ups have a policy, subordinates
have a countermeasure," describes this situation well.
The second important
instability concerns the legitimacy of the Communist Party. The pursuit
of a reformist open-door line has divided the society into various classes,
and has led to the diversification of interests and values among the
people. As the proportion grows of younger generations who do not have
first-hand knowledge of the communist revolution increases, more and
more people no longer identify themselves with the Communist Party.
Against this backdrop, experience and achievements of the revolution
and liberalization struggle which formerly served as a priori proof
of the legitimacy of the Communist Party rule are beginning to loose
their absolute significance. Demand for the formulation of procedures
to give a concrete form to democratic sovereignty has come out in the
open. The Communist Party will be forced to create a new rationale and
prop up the facade of orthodoxy to justify its leadership.
The third instability
is social discontent. Pursuit of reformist open-door policies has generated
many diverse benefits. The lack of the regulatory framework that would
ensure equitable distribution of those benefits within the society,
however, has led to the creation of a social structure characterized
by privileges and corruption, allowing improper concentration of riches
in the party's senior ranks and those with special connections to them.
This in turn has triggered mounting social discontent, and there has
been such strong criticism against the party rule that a report warned:
"out of present China's social ills, corruption has been the focus
of the greatest degree of the people's attention and discontent, and
is most difficult to achieve any improvement(2)." As
outlined above, understanding the Communist Party in the dimension of
today's Chinese society requires observation from dual perspectives
of its enormous presence and "instability".
As the fourth key
consideration for understanding the present conditions, it is necessary
to confirm the fundamental direction of China in the past and future;
i.e., economic construction through modernization and reformist open-door
line. Strong commitment to this line was expressed at the 14th National
Party Congress: "Uphold for 100 years without deviation."
Objectively speaking, this line may also be regarded as an irreversible
tide for the following three reasons.
Firstly, the present
theory of a socialist market economy is the product of more than a decade
and some-odd years of theorization, and as such is backed by stores
of well-developed theories. The theorization process began from the
shift of emphasis from the continuation of revolution to economic construction
and modernization at the third session of the 11th Party Congress in
1978. An open-door policy to foreign investment was adopted in 1979.
A socialist merchandise economy was proposed in 1984. Then, in 1987,
the theory of an elementary socialist development stage was introduced
as a stage of overall historical development, justifying the need to
let productive forces loose and develop a merchandise economy. Subsequently,
a coastal development strategy was announced in 1988, and an omnibus
open door strategy in 1991. Along these lines, establishment of a socialist
market economy was identified as the objective.
Secondly, the progress
of the modernization and reformist open-door policy was accompanied
by structural social change. In rural communities, people's communes
were dismantled, a contract responsibility system became widespread
among rural households, and Township and Village Enterprises rapidly
developed. These events created social strata, and caused migration
and diversification of values among peasants. In cities, structural
change in the economy took the form of the development of private enterprises
and stores, entry of foreign-affiliated companies, and expansion of
market mechanisms. Needless to say, the planned economy system still
exists in basic industries, and not much progress has been achieved
in streamlining state-run industries. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that
these changes will be reversed.
Thirdly, pursuit of
modernization and a reformist open-door line has more or less benefited
the majority of the Chinese people, albeit disproportionately. The Dengist
doctrine that some parts of the country may get rich before others,
certainly created extremely prosperous regions and individuals, but
the effects of economic reforms and open-door policy extended to the
inland, rural and border areas. Economic levels are at least somewhat
improved for these regions in general. It is not possible to expect
these ascending trends to continue perpetually in the future, but at
least disproportionate but overall improvement of economic levels may
well continue for the time being. Based on such understanding, modernization
and the reformist open-door line will likely be maintained as the basic
direction.
Finally, provincial
performance should be identified as the fifth key consideration for
understanding the present conditions. This is a political and economic
characteristic which gained prominence during the reformist era. Provinces
originally had important roles to play in political and economic arenas(3),
but acquired enormous power particularly as a result of the decentralization
policy of the central government during the reformist era. Particularly
marked as the contents of the decentralization was the relinquishing
of legislative power (local legislation) and implementation of a local
finance contract system.
As a result of these
policies, local governments (mainly coastal provinces such as Guangdong,
Fuchien, Chiangsu and Shantung) became prosperous, acquired many diverse
vested interests, and resisted or even raised open objections to some
of the central planners' policies and decisions. For example, the so-called
"fief economy phenomena" took place around 1988. Provinces
set up checkpoints at will and imposed restrictions on the exit and
entry of raw materials to and from other provinces. At an operations
meeting with provincial and municipal governors held before the 7th
session of the 13th Party Congress in December 1990, the central government
called for a bigger share of provincial corporate tax revenues to rectify
chronic budget deficits and re-centralization of powers relinquished
earlier. According to a report, local governments rebelled against this
demand, and the central government finally felt obliged to make some
concessions(4).
In 1992 the central
government tried to put a halt to the local construction boom of "open"
areas which had caused runaway inflation, but provinces disregarded
the central policy and "open" areas mushroomed across the
nation.
Relationships between
the central and local governments, extent of performance achieved by
local governments and relationships among local governments will become
increasingly important as factors in analyzing the characteristics of
administration, policy decisions, economic balance and changes in future
China. Attention will have to be paid to the relationship between the
central and local governments whether the future political system will
turn, for example, to authoritarianism or democracy(5).
The five key factors
identified above must be kept in mind whenever Chinese phenomena of
today or the future are under consideration.
2. Short-term outlook:
political movements before and in the post-Deng Xiaoping perio.
This section will
attempt to provide an outlook of the political scene upon uncertain
arrival of the post-Deng period under the assumption that it will be
within a year or two from now. Judging from the major political and
economic trends in the past, the following five points will likely be
identifiable as important underlying factors.
-
Continuance of
a reformist open-door line:
China will be forced to make strenuous efforts to cope with serious
problems such as worsening inflation, income disparities and securing
food supply for an ever-increasing population. It will have to find
equilibrium between efforts in such areas and the pursuit of a reformist
line.
-
Improvement of
overall economic performance:
Economic performance in this section means fruits or achievements
realized under a certain regime. According to Grossman's criteria,
for example, it includes prosperity, growth, stability, efficiency,
security, equality and/or fairness, economic freedom, economic independence
and environmental protection.
-
Acceleration of
disengagement from ideology:
Settlement of socialism vs. capitalism supremacy arguments among
the central leadership. Insatiable pursuit of economic interests
among high-ranking officials and the masses.
-
Progress of political
unrest and simultaneous increase of expectations and yearning for
stability:
This will be dealt with in more detail in the discussion of the
subsequent issue. What must be emphasized at this point is that
"despite growing instability" as characterized by rising
crime rates and the decline in the Communist Party's ability to
exercise control, loathing of political disruption will also be
prevalent due to the experience of continued economic expansion,
tragic history of the Cultural Revolution and witnessing of the
collapse of the socialist regime in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe.
-
Increasingly strong
influence of international events to domestic politics.
What are the noteworthy issues in the short-term outlook? The first
such issue is the power struggle for the post of paramount leader.
There are three alternatives.
1) Lawful struggle:
This will involve concrete cause such as obvious policy failure
or mounting social instability. For example, Jiang Zemin's leadership
will be questioned if the anti-corruption/graft campaign promoted
at his initiative fails to bring any notable results. Unlike earlier
days, ideological factors will not likely be the focus of the struggle.
The Political Bureau (Politburo) and Central Committee will be the
stage of the struggle, but provincial voices will be reflected in
its outcome considering the enhanced status of local governments
as outlined above. This will be principally a power struggle among
the present top leaders including Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and Qiao
Shi.
2) Unlawful struggle:
Looking back at Chinese history, there is a good chance of a court
coup similar to the Lin Biao incident and downfall of the Gang of
Four. Right or wrong of policies and lines will not be the primary
cause. It will arise out of a factor which will not be easily brought
to a legal channel such as blunt power struggle when it is brought
to an end in a short time due to the concerned parties' intention
to avoid nationwide political disruption. This will be a power struggle
behind closed doors and involve submerged leaders such as Zhao Ziyang
and Yang Shangkun who are deprived of power at present.
3) Amicable coordination
within leadership: Transition to and enhancement of collective leadership
by dividing responsibilities will be highly likely if there is no
radical antagonism on policies and lines and a strong will to avoid
disintegration among leaders who fail to reach consensus on a single
strong man upon whom absolute authority will be conferred. The author
believes that the present central leadership pivoting on Jiang Zemin
depends on Deng's authority for legitimacy, and regards it as "pseudo"
collective leadership which is in the gradual process of eliminating
the "pseudo" aspects.
The second issue is
the direction of the Communist Party rule. There are two considerations
as follows:
1) Will Deng's death
accelerate weakening of the party and lead to an eventual end of the
single-party monopoly on power? Presumably, weakening will be inevitable,
but the single-party system will not collapse that easily. It will
undergo some changes but remain largely intact because of the absence
of substitute governing machinery, and because the military will continue
to support the party at least for the time being, and people of all
classes and sectors still loathe or want to avoid disruption.
2) Is there any
prospect for restructuring and reconstruction of the party? For the
immediate future, it will depend on how successful the party's efforts
at internal democratization and economic management are. More specifically,
successful conquest of corruption, recovery of integrity and improvement
of ability to develop economic policies by the party and government
will be essential. Systematization of politics, establishment of a
legal framework and democratization will surface as important long-term
challenges.
Thirdly, In addition
to the first and second issues, the following four points are important
for political and social stability or instability:
1) Deterioration
of public peace and order and mounting social discontent caused by
aggravating graft and corruption: The seriousness of these problems
has been recognized for some time as represented by the establishment
of the Office of the Commissioner of General Social Order Administrationin
early 1990. Solution of graft and corruption has become an extremely
important issue.
2) Mounting discontent
with the authorities accompanied by the growing income gap and burden
disparities: Despite growing disparities, the central government has
chosen to follow the direction of reducing subsidies to local governments.
This in turn will presumably expand disparities. The problem of disproportionate
burdens comes to the fore in the explosion of discontent among peasants.
Wan Li reportedly stated at a National People's Congress in the spring
of 1993, "Nobody will be able to govern this country if peasants
really rise in riot. Nothing is wanting for us peasants [to rise in
riot]. Only Chen Sheng and Wu Guang are wanting."
3) The "economic
freedom and tight political control" line will have begun to
show its limitations, and political control will be more or less eased:
Opaque politics, non-separation of governments and enterprises, non-separation
of the party and governments, and failure to establish an adequate
system of appointing high-ranking officials are the roots of problems
such as rampant graft/corruption and mounting social unrest/discontent
brought about by economic reforms. Accordingly, there's no way but
launching a political reform.
4) Increasing tension
and conflicts between Beijing and the provinces: Defeat of gubernatorial
candidates recommended by the party's committee in Guangdong and Zhejiang
provinces in early 1993 demonstrates provincial performance. As the
central government strengthen its tendencies to let local governments
procure funds for fiscal/economic construction on their own, the latter
will become more and more independent from the former. At the same
time, powerful and appropriate central leadership will be called for
by the increasing importance of national issues such as natural resources,
energy, large-scale infrastructure and environment. The separate taxation
system introduced in 1994 represents an attempt at formulating an
institutional framework for fiscal affairs between the central and
local governments. It remains to be seen how effectively this system
will work.
3. Medium-term prospects
-- outlook at the beginning of the 21st centur.
Development of medium-term
prospects is a process involving numerous uncertainties, and does not
go far beyond the confines of forecasts. However, at least the following
statements can be made as material facts at the time which are presently
identifiable:.
-
A full-fledged
take-over of leadership by new generations will progress, generating
a fundamental qualitative change. One decisive point in this respect
would be how far the still-opaque leaders in their forties will
emerge, rather than those in their fifties about whom we have a
fairly good idea at present. New leaders will show almost no adherence
to Marxism-Leninism, but will likely remain strongly elitist. How
they perceive the relation between nationalism and internationalism
(focus on mutual dependency and international universalism) is important
as a basic stance of political leadership.
-
"One country,
two systems" will be advanced in concrete terms after Hong
Kong reverts to China. The question of integration and government
system will move to a new phase linked closely with changes in economic
and political leadership and international relationship. Chinese
"Hong Kong" has immense political and social implications.
Normalization of bilateral relations with Taiwan, which is highly
strained politically despite major developments in economic ties,
and realignment of the central and local governments will undoubtedly
affect the "state" of Chinese government regime greatly.
-
The reformist
open-door line will move to a new phase and mutual economic and
political dependency with the international community will deepen.
However, it is completely uncertain whether China will move toward
the direction of creating a unified national market, or toward linking
markets similar to regional economic zones directly with an international
economic system (development in the form of today's Greater China
economic zone). Furthermore, whether China's mutually dependent
relationship with the international community will be harmonious
and cooperative, or awkward and at times hostile, will depend on
its future political regime and economic changes including the external
economy.
Finally, a few comments
may be warranted as conclusions on medium-term prospects. If a major
war larger in scale than the Sino-Vietnam war in 1979 and nationwide
domestic political disruption can be avoided, overall performance of
China in the 21st century will certainly exceed that of the present
time regardless of mounting social contradictions such as expanding
disparities, population explosion and weakening government. Its implications
to the international community will depend on how the latter will perceive
China with these contradictions, what relationship it will aspire to
build with China, how seriously and patiently it will work to build
such a relationship, and how China will react to the international community.
Subsequent papers
will address these issues from respective perspectives.
References
-
Satoshi Amako:
China -- "Socialist Super Power in Transition," Tokyo
University Press, 1992, Introductio.
-
Paper by Wang
Tie in "Sociological Study," 3rd issue 199.
-
Satoshi Amako:
"Central and Local Governments in China -- a Frame of Reference
of Changes in Socialist Political Regime. In Modern Asia Course
3 -- Democratization and Economic Progress," p. 77 ff. Edited
by Noriyuki Hagiwara, Tokyo University Press, 199.
-
Hiroshi Nakajima:
"Present Conditions of Guangdong Economy -- Interview with
Ye Xuanping, Governor of Guangdong Province." In "Bulletin
of Japan-China Association of Economy and Trade," May 1991,
pp. 4-5.
-
Satoshi Amako:
"Composition of Independence and Integration in China -- Shift
to Cascade-type Authoritarian Regime." In "Political Changes
in Greater China," edited by Tatsumi Okabe, Keiso Shobo. 1995,
Chapter 1.
Remarks:
China in Transition
and its Outlook for the Future" by Satoshi Amako, Professor
of Aoyama Gakuin University and the Chairman of the Committee for
the "Study of Chinese Direction and Japanese Strategy,"
was inserted to introduce reports of the committee which met 18
times since 1994. This paper represents the introduction and overview
of the reports.
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