Hurdles for
Developing Clean Development Mechanism
Naoki
Matsuo
Senior Researcher, GISPRI/IGES*
1.
Introduction
The current Framework Convention on Climate Change established the worldwide
recognition of the significance of climate change issue. The Kyoto
Protocol is nothing but the first step for the ultimate objective of
the Convention, which is "the stabilization of GHGs concentration",
by introducing the binding "targets" on developed country
emissions (including those from economies in transition). The
Kyoto Protocol, however, does not include any new commitment for developing
countries.
In terms of developing countries participation, the clean development
mechanism (CDM), in which both developed and developing countries jointly
implement projects, can form a basis for an international framework
beyond the Kyoto Protocol, and its success will certainly take an extremely
important role in future climate change mitigation frameworks.
CDM was proposed by developing country side and its prominent purpose
is to assist the host developing countries to develop sustainably not
emphasize only on the developed country side incentives to earn credits.
With these desirable features of CDM, the remaining discussion pivots
around the actual designing of international institutional framework
which is supposed to be decided at the COP 6.
Furthermore, besides these UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol processes, the circumstantial
trends on CDM discussion are increasing their significance. Here,
let us look at some new trends related to investor side.
2.
Recent external trends
2.1
Move by the World Bank
The largest obstacle for implementing the CDM is its enormous risks
on investors, despite the intention to use the market mechanism.
Although every type of investment accompanies what we call a country
risk, CDM involves a risk from undetermined scheme details.
Therefore, the present CDM situation pushes investors
to hesitate on taking such risks, despite it is expected to be valid
since the year 2000 though the Protocol's ratification possibility is
greatly dependent on the US Senate. Nonetheless,
what is originally required for investors is to properly assess the
possible risks. For private industries, however, there is a limit
on such assessment capacity.
The World Bank, with its purpose of initiating a market of emission
allowances and credits, started the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) as a
program to reduce these investor risks by utilizing its own know-how.
Although delayed for a considerable period, the program actually started
(with approval of its Board) and would formulate a group of investors
by the middle of November, and schedule to collect sufficient fund by
the end of January, 2000. The scheduled fund for the program is
US$ 75 to 100 million initially and US$ 150 million at the maximum.
Some national governments and big corporations have expressed their
intention to participate in the program.
2.2
The trend of national emissions trading systems
Private companies require some incentives for participating in CDM to
earn emission credits. These incentives are rather a national
framework on emission control than an international one. Already
in the United States, the participating companies of USIJI program,
a national AIJ scheme, are allowed to use credits earned from USIJI
for complying with the domestic voluntary targets.
The most direct method of domestic incentives is for a national government
to allow the application of CDM credits for attaining self-imposed targets.
(As a supplemental measure) It will be preferable for this type of incentives
to allow the intra-company trading of emissions and emission credits.
Some developed countries are already reviewing practical measures to
introduce a domestic emission trading system before the year 2008.
Denmark has introduced the regulations on a domestic emission trading
system applicable for power industry only. Norway and other countries
are following the suit. New Zealand and Australia are also reviewing
such a system at the national government level. Sweden is also
following such trend. In the United States, both houses of the
Senate and Representatives have some legislative on the floor (although
their passing will have many obstacles). Canada is in review of
such a system but will follow US policy direction.
Although there is no talk of official reviewing of such systems in Japan,
it needs to examine such possibility as an option for ratifying the
Protocol.
3.
Summary and tasks
A proper
problem for CDM is the importance of designing actual procedures.
Among these, the biggest problem is how to define the acceptability
of CDM projects, in other words, how to draw the trajectory between
CDM and the situation without the project, and how to determine the
quantity of credits to be earned in each approved CDM project.
For the former problem, one controversial issue is the use of ODA (and
other public funds) for CDM. The international negotiation on
CDM has not addressed any practical argument on this matter. It
seems Japan is the only country claiming the applicability of ODA for
CDM. Recently, the European Commission started to step into this
issue in its document of COM(99)230 discussing the "methodology"
of ODA use.
In addition, there are other problems in CDM, including how to ensure
the assistance for the sustainable development of host developing countries,
how to address sink-related projects, and whether to allow existing
AIJ projects as CDM projects or not.
For the issue of credit determination, the focal point is the discussion
on emission baseline setting, especially its standardizing methods.
In the term of baseline setting, it is unlikely for COP 6 to determine
the methods for every type of projects.
Yet, it will be necessary for COP 6 to indicate the 'procedure' in baseline
setting, at least.
The time limit for the submission of each country Party proposal on
the designing of Kyoto Mechanisms was July 31, 1999. I would like
to anticipate significant progress since the subsidiary bodies' meeting
in June, 1999.
* Institute
for Global Environment Strategies
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