Takashi Shiraishi
Professor, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

There are various kinds of meanings in saying "Japan within Asia".

Japan is geographically positioned along the coast of the Asian continent.
In this sense, it is needless to say that Japan is located within Asia.    Since
the Japanese race is Mongoloid, we are also racially Asian.  However, when
I refer to "Japan within Asia", it is not about Japan or the Japanese people
being part of Asia geographically or racially.  Neither is it about Japan
departing from European influences and associating closer with the rest of
Asia, in paradox to the famous slogan by the 19th century scholar Yukichi
Fukuzawa calling on Japan to depart from Asian influences and associate
closer with Europe.  For Fukuzawa, the words "Asia" and "Europe" signified
two totally different civilizations.    In today's world, Japan is left with no
such choices.  Regardless of whether we like it or not, Japan is being
engulfed in the historical wave of Americanization in the name of
globalization.  In any event, no one would realistically believe one of Japan's
future options could be reverting to the tradition of Confucianism, which
defines China as the center of the world, and following its transformation
into socialism.

These are not what I want to discuss under the topic "Japan within Asia".
For me, the word "Asia" represents the political and economic order in the
region of East Asia, encompassing Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China's
coastal provinces, and South East Asian countries.  The title "Japan within
Asia" signifies the position Japan assumes, or should assume, in the political
and economic order of the region.  Let me explain what it means in more
details.

First, we must identify what kind of regional order Asia has held so far, and
what Japan's positioning has been.

To answer these questions, it is a good idea to examine the problems the
United States experienced in Asia in the 1950s.  In those days, the United
States boasted an overwhelming power and wealth in the world, but faced
two major problems in Asia.  One was how it should handle the threat of
communism in the region, i.e., how it could contain the influences of China
and the Soviet Union.  The other was how it could ensure that Japan would
never re-emerge as a threat to the United States, while facilitating Japan's
economic recovery and subsequent independence as a U.S. ally.

In regard to security, the United States devised a well-known solution to the
two problems; the conclusion of the security treaty with Japan.  As a result,
Japan became one of the U.S. military outposts, with Japanese self defense
capabilities being integrated into the U.S.-led security arrangement.  The
United States also concluded similar bilateral security accords with South
Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.  This way, Washington built a wheel-
like security system in Asia, with the United States at the axle and bilateral
treaties extending to individual countries like spokes.

As for the economic solution, the United States built a triangular trading
structure with Japan and South East Asia.  In those days, Japan, striving
to achieve economic recovery, sought an import market for raw materials,
and export market for its manufactured goods.  China had served as
Japan's import and export partner before World War Two.  However, in
order to contain Chinese influence in Asia, the United States could not allow
Japan to continue to turn to China for that purpose.  Instead, the United
States provided economic and military assistance to South East Asia, which,
in turn, exported raw materials to and imported manufactured goods from
Japan.  The mechanism simultaneously addressed the tasks of recovering
the Japanese economy and developing South East Asian economies.  This
was the basic concept of the triangular trading structure.

The foundation of post-war Asia's political and economic order was laid this
way by the United States in the 1950s.  The order has since experienced
many significant changes.  In the 1980s, China entered the triangular trade
system.  Now, the United States has become Japan and East Asia's export
market for their manufactured goods, with Japan serving as the capital
provider for the entire system.  Still, Asia has yet to abandon the founding
concept of the post-war political and economic order, defining the United
States as No.1 and Japan as No.2.  The structure is deeply built into
Japan's domestic political and economic systems.  This is evident when you
examine Japan's "semi-sovereign" status under the Japan-U.S. security
arrangement, and Japan's "economic cooperation" system defining "economic
prosperity" as the fundamental national value.

Then, what are the structural characteristics of Asia's regional order?  They
become clear when the Asian order is compared against that of post-war
Europe (West Europe).  Let us go back to the 1950s again.  At the time, the
United States also had two main problems to resolve in Europe.  One was
how it could deal with the threat of communism in the region, i.e., how Soviet
influences could be contained.  The other was how it could ensure that
Germany (West Germany) would never re-emerge as a threat to the United
States, while facilitating Germany's economic recovery and independence as
a U.S. ally.  Washington opted for a different solution in Europe than in
Asia.  The security solution was the establishment of NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) as the collective security body, under which Germany
was re-militarized.  The economic solution was the development of a
collective economic cooperation system built around the alliance between
Germany and France.  This eventually led to the formation of EEC
(European Economic Community), EC (European Community), and EU
(European Union).

The comparison clearly illustrates the characteristics of Asia's regional order
and Japan's positioning within the region.  Germany was placed in the
"North Atlantic" group in regard to security and "European" group in regard
to economy.  In this sense, Germany was given a stable position within
Europe.  This is why Germans define themselves as Europeans, entrust
their future in Europeanism, and adopt multilateralism as their principle for
action within the European Union.

In contrast to how Germany was integrated into Europe, Japan was never
placed as an integral part of Asia.  Instead, Japan was defined as its own,
dealing with, for example, South Korea or South East Asia individually.  In
this sense, Japan's relationship with the rest of Asia has been "Japan and
Asia" rather than "Japan within Asia".  This is why Japanese people
consider themselves only as the Japanese, and feel somewhat resentful when
classified as "Asians".  Unlike Germans resting their future on the
European grouping, the Japanese would never dump the yen, abolish
protective measures for their agricultural industry, or relinquish the
commanding rights to the self defense forces, and entrust their future to Asia.
Another Japanese characteristic is its use of bilateralism as the principle for
action within Asia.

Given the situation, what is the significance of discussing "Japan within
Asia"?  Let me confirm that I believe Japan will not become integrated into
Asia, in the way Germany did into Europe, in the next 100 years or even in
the foreseeable future.  This is because the Japanese economy is far too big
to be incorporated into part of Asia.  Yet, that does not mean that Japan can
continue to hold the "Japan and Asia" relationship with the rest of Asia.
Not when important changes have been underway in the last decade on
Japan's position within the Asian region.

The changes are manifesting themselves most prominently in the economic
area, especially in relation to South East Asia.  Since the mid 1980s,
Japanese companies have made direct investments, established joint
ventures, and developed local production networks in South East Asia.
Such moves made it difficult for Japanese industrial policies to maintain
consistency if they stay within the national framework.  In addition, direct
investments by Japan and NIEs altered the incentive mechanism of South
East Asian companies and governments, and accelerated the liberalization of
local trade within the framework of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian
Nations).    Starting in the mid 1980s, Asia became integrated in a scale
never seen before.  The degree of integration was observed in the recent
economic crisis engulfing the whole of Asia.  Now, it has become the interest
of Japan to ensure stability and prosperity in the Asian economy.  This is
why the Japanese government has made numerous policy moves, including
the Miyazawa Initiative, at the time of the Asian economic crisis.  However,
no major changes have been seen in the security framework of East Asia.

To put it simply, Japan maintains the "Japan and Asia" stance in regional
security, while becoming "Japan within Asia" in terms of economy.  Based
on this analysis of the current situation, what should Japan do from now on
with what objectives?

It may be difficult for Japan to take the initiative in security and political
matters.  Yet, we are well positioned to explore possibilities in economic,
cultural, intellectual, and technological cooperation.   Expanding and
deepening exchanges in these areas can gradually change economical, social,
and cultural parameters in the Japan-Asian relationship.  In the process,
Japan can expand its moving space in the region in the long run,
subsequently bringing about benefits to South Korea and South East Asia.
We can build such a mechanism within the existing regional order.  One
such example was the attempt, although unsuccessful, to set up the Asian
Monetary Fund.  Japan must use such a mechanism to explore a new
relationship with the rest of Asia in the long term.  The vision of "Japan
within Asia" sets this direction.
 

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